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Review-Essay on: Scomposizioni. Forme dell'individuo moderno by Remo 
Bodei (Torino: Einaudi, 1987) and Geometria delle passioni. Paura, speran-
za, felicita: Jilosofia e uso politico by Remo Bodei (Milano: Feltrinelli, 
1991) 
Remo Bodei's Scomposizioni introduces its theme with a fragment writ-
ten by Hegel sometime between 1798 and 1801. The fragment begins 
by announcing 
the ever-widening contradiction [Der immer sich vergrissernde 
Widerspruch] between the unknown, which humans obscurely 
[bewusstlos] seek, and the life that is open to and permitted them . 
This statement-of what we might call Hegel's Contradiction-is 
dense and elliptical, but its intent seems clear. Hegel is preoccupied 
with the restrictions placed on our lives by the competing claims of 
actuality and ideality, by the divide cleaving general from particular: 
in short, by the limitations arising from a human existence that must 
be lived as a subjective striving in the midst of subject-constricting 
objects. 
In fact it is the notion of limit that unifies the concerns of both 
Scomposizioni and Bodei's more recent Geometria delle passioni. For 
though their avenues of approach are diverse, both books are 
addressed to that set of problems generally subsumed under the head-
ing of the crisis of the subject. Indeed, the crisis of the subject becomes 
most clearly detectable with the discovery of one or another of the fac-
tors limiting its activity, self-possession, or capacity to project itself in 
the world; with this understanding of limit as the center of gravity on 
which the intelligibility of crisis balances, Bodei takes up a multifac-
eted investigation that is both historical-genealogical and contempo-
rary all at once. By no means is it the first time Bodei has used such an 
approach, of course: these two recent works continue along lines plot-
ted out in such work as Bodei's study of the dissolution of the subject 
in the context of 19th-century French psychopathology. 
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Scomposizioni is in some respects a period study. Bodei begins 
with the problem of limit as stated in Hegel's fragment, and proceeds 
to examine the attempted solutions offered by some of Hegel's con-
temporaries. These solutions-which took the various forms of recon-
ciliation, overcoming, and resignation-provide Bodei with the poetic 
and philosophical filters through which to consider the implications of 
Hegel's Contradiction. 
First, though, Bodei provides an explication of the fragment that 
also serves as a statement of the problem to be investigated. The "ever-
widening contradiction," stated as a general structure of relation, is that 
between the subject and the subject-limiting object. Although the object 
can be identified with nature, it can just as well take the form of those 
social figures and institutions representing unquestionable authority. In 
a sense, these are the purported vicars of nature, the administrators of 
the alleged natural order of things from which their claims of authority 
ultimately derive; they are lawgivers who are conceived of as simple 
law-upholders serving a law-nature-that already has been conse-
crated and put into operation. Even given a general consent to their 
ideological underpinnings, such laws tend to harden into rigid forms, 
and suffocate those who are subjected to them. Hegel's problem then, 
as Bodei restates it, is to found or foster an intersubjective rapport that 
will transcend both the externally imposed restraints of a dry legalism 
and the internally imposed restraints of a resigned acceptance of things 
as they are. Any solution to this problem would involve, as Bodei 
describes it, an "eticite" in which the letter of the law can be reconciled 
to its spirit. 
Bodei detects two general lines of response to Hegel's 
Contradiction, as expressed by Hegel's contemporaries. The first con-
sists of a blind urge toward the unknown, to an alternative-the 
details of which are unfocused or perhaps completely obscure-that 
will sweep away the present, intolerable situation. The second is the 
mirror opposite of the first: a withdrawal into the imaginative refuge 
of a life of interiority. Thus the contradiction imposed by sanctioned 
limits generates a second order contradiction of its own-a contradic-
tion between mutually exclusive responses to the original contradic-
tion. It is to these responses that Bodei turns next. 
Bodei looks to the poets Novalis and Holderlin for examples of 
the embrace of the unknown. For Novalis, the unknown was a kind of 
elsewhere sanctified as "<las heilige Nichts," a holy Nothingness. The 
pursuit of such nothingness, as Bodei shows, was for Novalis an end 
in itself. The case of Holderlin, in Bodei's reading, is somewhat differ-
ent. Here, the unknown is to be found, and confronted without fear, in 
a specifically temporal, rather than spatial, projection. Deliverance 
from the known by the unknown will be found in a temporal transcen-
dence toward the future, and the corresponding forgetting of the past. 
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Novalis and Holderlin represent the urge toward the unknown 
as articulated by a segment of the educated elite. Bodei also notes the 
parallel, though significantly different, articulation by the non-elites of 
the same urge. For this latter group, limits are absolutized, and author-
ities accepted as part of the natural order. Yet something better-some-
thing other-is still desired, even if this desire takes the form of a pas-
sivity that would seem to have its root in resignation. In fact such 
passivity, as read by Bodei, seems more of a postponing than an eradi-
cation of the impulse to the as yet unknown: such is a festering rather 
than a withdrawal. It is for good reason that Bodei cites Tocqueville's 
observation that Germany at the end of the eighteenth century seemed 
gripped by a feeling that change was imminent, though one was unin-
formed by a clear idea as to the how, when, or into what. 
Under the heading of "flight," Bodei discusses the other response 
to Hegel's Contradiction: that of withdrawal. Bodei does this through 
the figures of Christ, Rousseau, and Fichte. For Bodei, the Christ that 
Hegel portrays in Die Positivitiit der christlichen Religion epitomizes the 
figure withdrawn from the world-but of very little difference is 
Rousseau's notion of following one's own nature through nature, in 
the relinquishing of will and reflection alike. If Rousseau's program 
entails the dispersal of human will into nature, Fichte's takes the 
opposite tack in calling for the absorption of nature into an infinite 
subject. 
Yet it is Bodei' s Goethe, influenced by Bruno and Spinoza, who 
collects and transforms the opposed impulses of blind urge and con-
templative withdrawal. Goethe's vision of the coming of freedom 
replaces impulse and quietism with a path of evolution. For Bodei, 
Goethe's commitment is illustrated by his preoccupation, late in life, 
with the dispute between the biologists Cuvier and Saint-Hilaire. 
Against Cuvier's theory of the origins and extinctions of species 
through the agency of catastrophic upheavals, Goethe supported 
Saint-Hilaire's theory of an evolutionary, gradual development. 
Goethe, Bodei points out, was more interested in this dispute than in 
the ramifications of the 1830 Revolution that continued to shake 
France. 
Bodei's engagement of Goethe-and his designation of the peri-
od under examination as Goethan age---shows Bodei' s willingness to 
look beyond a dialectics of necessary contradiction. The title of 
Scomposizioni's concluding section, "Hegel e oltre," attests to that. 
Bodei's way will take us on an alternate route leading through 
Spinoza, and on toward a different formulation of the problem. 
Already in Scomposizioni, Spinoza functioned as a now-explicit, 
now-implicit touchstone. In the Geometria delle passioni, his influence 
comes to the fore. We need only note that the title of the Geometria 
recalls the method informing Spinoza's Ethics, a work in which the 
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author analyzed and defined the ethical dimensions and interactions 
of the emotions and the intellect under the rigor of a systematic struc-
ture of propositions and proofs. Yet it is the emancipatory purpose of 
both works, I believe, that ultimately forms the basis of comparison. 
The overriding purpose of Spinoza's Ethics consists in its attempt 
to provide for the liberation of the person from the bondage of passivi-
ty and ignorance combined. Bodei is about the same business, and in a 
similar way. The similarity lies not only in the choice of the passions as 
a topic of investigation, but also in the manner of formulation of the 
question of the pass ions' place in human activity. This formulation 
rejects at the outset the dualist view that imagines human being as 
rent by an antagonistic relationship between reason and the passions. 
Bodei characterizes such a dualist view as belonging to an outlook that 
has already become a part of the past, though one that is not without a 
certain lingering influence. Such a dualist view establishes a priority of 
value of reason over passion, the ideal equilibrium of which would 
entail the suppression of the latter by the former. Indeed this is an old 
story in the West, and not only in the West, if we consider such sys-
tems as M_dhyamika Buddhism, with its rigorously logical explication 
of desire as affliction, or classical Hinduism as expressed in the Gita, 
with its doctrine of the renunciation of all desire for the fruits of activi-
ty. 
In accordance with Spinoza's perspective on the modes of 
human affectedness, Bodei rejects a conception of human subjectivity 
that represses, by not confronting, the role of the non-rational in 
human activity. As with Scomposizioni, Bodei chooses a historical epoch 
to illustrate his thesis. This time French Jacobinism serves as the 
model. Bodei shows how the drive toward a new state of affairs is 
pushed not simply by an urge as such (a blind impulse, say, as with 
Novalis and Holderlin), but by a complex of emotion and reason: the 
Revolution was driven not only by the Utopian aspirations of its lead-
ers, but by the widespread fear provoked by the violence of terror, and 
the increasing rationalization of techniques and ideologies. In this con-
nection, it is interesting to recall Spinoza's assertion that hope and fear 
cannot be extricated from the pain that invariably accompanies them. 
Although the scene has shifted from Germany to France, we can 
see a similarity of construction binding these two milieus. For French 
Jacobinism seized the frustration arising from increasingly vexed 
social relations and intolerably repressive limitations allegedly 
ordained by nature and upheld by the ancien regime. The Jacobins 
directed (and no doubt manipulated) emancipatory strivings , the exact 
conditions and dimensions of which were, strictly speaking, not fully 
clear. We can read this historical case as an example of an attempted 
making good of the "ever-widening contradiction:" the historical 
episode imprinted by the Jacobins provides an instance of the guid-
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ance and articulation of the multitudes' impulse toward the surpass-
ing of an intolerably limiting given. 
And yet there is something more at work in Bodei' s Geometria. 
Certainly, the question introduced in Scomposizioni is still in operation, 
at least in its broadest form: How does one achieve a reconciliation 
(perhaps through revolutionary transformation?) between what is 
given and what is desired? But in the Geometria, the angle of approach 
has changed. What is now allowed is an interpenetration of the two 
sides of the equation-of the subject on one side, and the subject-limit-
ing object, or nature, on the other. Such an interpenetration, of course, 
transmutes the entire equation, and restructures it as something else 
altogether. To see how this can be, and why it should be, we must 
return to the end of Scomposizioni. 
The idea Bodei leaves with us at the conclusion is that of the cri-
sis of the dialectical model, with its language of subject and object, and 
its postulation of a necessary state of contradiction between the two 
terms. At least as it is expressed in the fragment, Hegel's dialectic 
implies an ontological alienation that arises from the limitations nature 
places on the human actor. This latter must be conceived in turn as a 
subject constituted in opposition to the nature-object. This, then, is the 
essence of Hegel's Contradiction: the subject is forever held in check 
by the object, and the particular cannot be made whole by its aggrega-
tion into a concretizing (and reciprocally concretized) totality. What is 
denied the subject at the level of an intersubjective, horizontal integra-
tion is likewise prevented at the level of intrasubjectivity. 
Yet this insuperable alienation may be constituted as much by its 
manner of formulation as by the ontological relation that that formula-
tion purports to express. And it is here that Bodei finds fault with the 
dialectic and its postulation of an eventual absorption of the individ-
ual into an encompassing "macro-subject." For that is the form that the 
reconciliation of the "ever-widening contradiction" must take. Bodei 
questions not only the necessarily futural, diachronic development of 
this macro-subjective absorption of the individual, but also its neces-
sary lack of allowance for the synchronic integration of any individual 
element so absorbed . If we were to look instead to the phenomenon of 
the individual living synchronically, Bodei implies, we would find, 
instead of a unitary subject in the process of absorbing and being 
absorbed by the Other, an "io modulare" -a modular subject-that is 
dispersed into its various Erlebnisse, or engagements. The world-
engaged subject, rather than being pulled up to a point of macro-sub-
jective convergence, instead is separated out into its diverse modes by 
the centrifugal force of its engagements. 
With this criticism, Bodei amplifies a point made earlier, in a 
paper he delivered at a 1983 symposium at New York University. The 
paper was entitled "Beyond Dialectical Thinking," and its point was 
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that the crisis in dialectical thinking corresponds to a more general cri-
sis of subjectivity, as well as to an enduring crisis regarding the ability, 
and desirability, of any whole to absorb and subsume individual mem-
bers. With their historical contextualizing of the crisis of subjectivity, 
Scomposizioni and Geometria della passioni mark an advance over this 
earlier paper. In the later works, the history of the individual is read 
through the history of individuality conceived of as problematic: look-
ing both ways, we can see that these are two sides of the same coin, a 
coin that is more worn that we may care to admit. 
For the crisis of the subject is contemporaneous with the discov-
ery of the problem of limits. What is important to emphasize is not 
that limits must be conceived of as problematic-not necessarily in 
and of themselves, at any rate-but that the limiting case, by virtue of 
its presumably extraordinary character, must problematize the pur-
portedly ordinary. That, I would argue, is at the root of this particular 
crisis of the subject. 
The role of non-rational elements in the production and (espe-
cially) execution of purposive activity is just such a limiting case. We 
may normally conceive of purposive activity as arising from a rational 
consideration of alternatives (based on beliefs regarding the actor's 
capacities and the situation's susceptibility or resistance to modifica-
tion), a judgment regarding the proper means and goals of activity, 
and the execution of whatever course of action has been decided upon. 
Undoubtedly there are many instances of goal-directed activity that 
conform to this model of volitional construction, and though by no 
means does this model exhaust all possible forms for the performance 
of action in the world, it does provide a straightforward model of 
rational activity. But the appearance can be misleading. 
The difficulty arises when we look closely at the motivational 
state or occurrent purpose (in the sense of being accessible to the actor 
in a reasonably complete tokening) underlying such rational activity. 
Goal-directed behavior is behavior intended toward the attainment of 
a projected state of affairs, this much is implied in its designation as 
goal-directed behavior. But a goal, no matter how rationally selected 
and constructed, begins with something we can express (loosely) as a 
desire: that is, a futurally-directed receptivity to a certain outcome. 
Thus a volitional motivational state is an aggregate of elements of 
belief, judgment, articulated desires, and receptivities in varying 
degrees. The operative term here is "receptivity" --our accepting open-
ness to a particular state of things that we would like to obtain. 
Rational goal-intending activity thus may take place for a reason, but 
that reason is predicated on a receptivity the origins of which are not 
necessarily rational. 
Given this structure of goal-intending behavior, we are faced 
with the prospect that the force of receptivity may elude or subvert the 
daniel barbiero 299 
process of rational goal selection. We may, for example, acknowledge a 
certain receptivity to a particular outcome, endorse it (in other words, 
identify ourselves with it as being "ours"), and decide to pursue it. Yet 
a stronger receptivity to an entirely different outcome may prevent our 
execution of the action we decided in favor of. We may, in other 
words, choose other than what we have decided. 
That such apparently paradoxical activity not only occurs, but 
occurs frequently, should be puzzling to a classical rationalist position. 
Such a position, we may assume, is based on a conception of a tran-
scendental subject as a unifier, and ultimate rationalizer, of occurrent 
desires and behaviors. The upsurge and execution of unauthorized 
receptivities naturally would pose a threat to the coherence of behav-
ior that reasonably could be expected of a transcendental subjectivity. 
This is not to say that the existence of such apparently defiant recep-
tivities have been ignored in past accounts of rational action: we need 
only look to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for a discussion of akrasia, 
or action supposed to exhibit a weakness of will, or incontinence, in 
the akratic actor. 
But it would be wrong to think that between the judgment ( or 
decision) and the actual situated choice that will execute and thereby 
realize that judgment, the passions can intervene and overthrow rea-
son's carefully crafted plan with an irrational impulse. This may hap-
pen in some cases, but the structural truth of the matter is more com-
plicated. In fact it is against such a dualistic scheme that opposes the 
rational to the irrational that Bodei, following Spinoza's example, con-
structed his Geometria in the first place. The "passions" (and even this 
is too broad a term, as it can encompass such disparate phenomena as 
impulses, appetites, modes of being affected, and the instantiations of 
certain dispositions toward being affected) are not alien, intervening 
(or supervening) forces, but constituent elements in the domain of 
activity. 
The passions, in the guise of the force behind various receptivi-
ties, play an integral role in our grasp of the holism of mind and body. 
Nor is this role an obstructing one, as it might appear to a rationalist 
position built on the fear of affective force. Bodei is right, in the 
Geometria, to conceive of human being as structured by a cognitive-
affective holism. The body is not simply inhabited by an alienated and 
controlling mechanism that Ryle scoffingly called "the ghost in the 
machine," but is existed as a concrete presence interpreted in meaning 
states and concrete modes of affectedness. This is to say that the 
body's states of movement and equilibrium are interpretable not only 
through tokened content states, but also through its concrete, content-
less states of affectedness. It is presumably with the sense of this 
meaning in mind-if the anachronism of terminology can be forgiv-
en-that Spinoza, in his Ethics, claims that the body in its extension is 
300 DIFFERENT/A 
the object of the mind not necessarily insofar as the body is intended, 
but as far as its movements are an interpreted presence. In Spinoza's 
terms, the mind grasps the body through ideas of the body's modifica-
tions. Yet even when such interpretation is intentional-that is to say, 
tokened in directed content states comprised of semantic entities of 
whatever sort-it appears against a background of affectedness. Our 
bodily modifications and behaviors are meaningful as felt as well as 
known: we cannot escape a situatedness that involves our acting on, 
and being acted on by, objects that provoke our desires and revulsions. 
In short, our status as beings constituted by a cognitive-affective 
holism provides for the de facto horizontal integration of our different 
modes. Such horizontal integration, which is evidenced in the perfor-
mance of skilled activity occurring under the description of a cogni-
tive-affective self-presence, is the other, functional, side of Bodei's "io 
modulare." Drawing approvingly from Schutz, Bodei suggests that the 
different modes of the modular subject arise within and are meaning-
ful in terms of the diverse "mondi vitali" that comprise the aggregate 
life world of everyday and specialized endeavors, or practical fields. 
The unity of any such mode of the "io modulare" -which latter self-
evidently must be understood in terms of modes of behavior, and ulti-
mately as a series of instantiations of particular dispositions to act, 
given relevant competences and belief states-would derive from the 
practical field in which activity arises or is necessitated. 
In fact such modularity of the agent not only allows, but requires 
the horizontal integration of each of the agent's various modes. The 
prerequisite of competence is learning, which entails the interpretation 
of self and surroundings in order best to adapt the former to the latter. 
Even the successful activation of competences and skills, no matter 
how unconsciously done, or unthought (at least to the extent that no 
tokened intentional state is occurrent at the time of activity), entails a 
self-presencing of affectedness interpretable in the appropriate capaci-
ty, in order that the actor can gauge the performance. 
(A corresponding vertical integration, through which all modes 
of behavior are aggregated into a transcendental sense of self, is not 
assumed by horizontal integration. In order for such vertical integra-
tion to be constituted, persistent patterns of behavior must be postu-
lated out of the raw observed data of motivational states and activities 
that are accessible to the actor by way of the descriptive contents or 
concrete modes of affectedness in force at the time of activity. Vertical 
integration, in other words, would consist in an after the act aggrega-
tion of the constituent modes of the modular subject. But by no means 
is this meant to imply that the subject's different modes by definition 
are mutually sealed off.) 
It is with the recognition of a horizontal integration of reason and 
passion, of cognition and affectedness, that we return to the projection 
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of a "comprensione trasformatrice" that Bodei offered in his contribu-
tion to Crisi della ragione. For if there is to be an unfolding auto-com-
prehension, the unfolding of which would transform the process of 
unfolding by virtue of a broadening of that which is to be compre-
hended-it seems to me that it must take the form of an articulation of 
the horizons (or limits, if you prefer) within which a subject's modes 
of behavior are instantiated. It is in this respect that Bodei' s turn to 
Spinoza is illuminating. For it was Spinoza who claimed that emanci-
pation would follow if an adequate understanding of bodily modifica-
tions could be had; what is this recommendation if not a prole-
gomenon to a hermeneutics of activity in the world? 
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